Neighbors, knowledge, and nuggets: two natural field experiments on the role of incentives on energy conservation by Dolan, Paul & Metcalfe, Robert
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1222 
June 2013 
Neighbors, Knowledge, and Nuggets: 
Two Natural Field Experiments on the 
Role of Incentives on Energy Conservation 
Paul Dolan and Robert Metcalfe 
 
 
    
Abstract 
There is increasing research on the exogenous impact of descriptive social norms on economic 
behavior. The research to date has a number of limitations: 1) it has not de-coupled the impact of the 
norm and the knowledge required to understand how to change behavior based upon it; 2) it has 
exclusively used offline but not online (i.e. emails) methods; and 3) it has not understood the impact 
of financial incentives in conjunction with norms. We address these three limitations using two 
natural field experiments. We find, firstly, that norms change energy behavior over a 15 month 
treatment period irrespective of whether information is provided or not. We find that social norms 
reduce consumption by around 6% (0.2 standard deviations). Norms have has their largest impact on 
the day that information on the social norm is received, and then decreases over time. Secondly, we 
do not find that social norms work online (even with experienced consumers who are used to online 
billing) - social norms de- livered online may have very little beneficial effects on reducing energy 
use. Thirdly, we find that large financial rewards work very well online in reducing consumption, 
with a 0.35σ change in energy consumption over a four month period. Perhaps most interestingly, we 
find that the large effect of financial incentives is completely removed when information on social 
norms is added online. 
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1 Introduction
An increasing number of studies have suggested that reference to social norms
can change a whole range of behaviors (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996; Parsons &
Shils, 1951; Sherif, 1936). The exogenous impact of social norms has been
tested by economists mainly in energy/resource use (Ayers et al., 2009; Costa
& Kahn, 2010; Allcott, 2011; Ferraro & Price, 2013), charitable giving (Frey &
Meier, 2004; Croson & Shang, 2008), voting (Gerber & Rogers, 2009), retirement
savings (Duflo & Saez, 2003; Beshears et al., 2009) and employee effort (Fehr
et al., 1998; Bandiera et al., 2006).
We extend this literature in three main ways. Firstly, we test the impact of
social norms independent of the knowledge of how to change behavior. Secondly,
we test whether social norms have an effect on behavior irrespective of the
mode of delivery (i.e. oﬄine letters versus online emails). There has been little
evidence of the same intervention delivered in different formats. Thirdly, we test
financial rewards, i.e. nuggets, to reduce consumption, and interact them with
social norms. Incentives and norms have never before been tested in conjucntion
with one another.
We now discuss these three issues in more depth. Firstly, the impact of
norms on behaviors such as charitable giving and productivity might be quite
different to that of other behaviors such as resource use. The key difference in
these behaviors is understanding the production function of the behavior. For
instance, in charitable giving, the input is in the same currency as the output,
so the production function is very clear. So if an individual knows that the
average person (i.e. the norm) contributes $5 more than her, she knows that
all she has to do is give $5 more and she will be behaving according to the
norm. For resource use, however, the norm is in resource use aggregates (such
as total kilowatts per hour (kWh) over a three month period i.e. the output).
So it requires a basic understanding about how inputs (i.e. behaviors such as
temperature of heating in the home, cooking food, etc.) impact on the output
(total resource use in kWh). So if an individual consumes 100kWh more energy
than the average person, she may not know which behaviors can be modified
and in which ways to reduce her energy consumption by 100kWh.
This is analogous to the research examining the education production func-
tion, where children may need to be incentivized on the inputs to educational
attainment and not the output for effective motivation (see Fryer, 2011). This
stream of research also suggests that traditional financial incentives provided to
2
individuals might crowd out some intrinsic reasons for a behavior (Benabou &
Tirole, 2003). There has also been evidence on the cognitive costs on individual
behavior in a wide range of markets, such as retail purchases (Chetty et al.,
2007), health (Kling et al, forthcoming) and retirement (Hastings & Tejeda-
Ashton, 2008). This may be one of the reasons that the large field experiments
to date in energy consumption have provided information on how to change be-
havior in addition to the social norm (see Ayers et al., 2009; Allcott, 2011) or a
change in pricing (Kahn & Wolak, 2013; Ida et al., 2013). Such information has
eased the cognitive costs of understanding how to change behavior (in terms of
search, learning and attention costs) if the individual wants to conform to the
norm.
While these studies have shown consistent positive effects on behavior from
the norm with information (Allcott & Mullainathan, 2011; Allcott & Rodgers,
2012), we might have overstated the importance of the norm and understated
the impact of basic information and knowledge. We have little knowledge of
whether the social norm works on its own without basic information provision
and very little evidence in field experimental settings. This is exactly what we
test in our first natural field experiment, i.e. the impact of norms with and
without basic information. The closest study to ours is by Duflo & Saez (2003),
who found that peer effects combined with incentives to obtain information on
retirement decisions works well to encourage take up of tax deferral accounts.
We use a private descriptive norm rather than using observable peers.
Secondly, there has been some evidence on the comparison of oﬄine versus
online behaviors. There have been attempts to use online as medium for behav-
ior change, but these have mainly been in auction design (Hossain & Morgan,
2006; Lucking-Reiley, 2000). More generally, Horton et al (2010) replicate vari-
ous economic experiments in online laboratories, and suggest that their results
are similar to oﬄine behaviour. So there is increasing evidence that peoples
online and oﬄine behaviours are very similar. There is very little evidence how-
ever on the causal effect of mode of delivery on the treatment effect of social
norm interventions. There are no large scale field experiments to date that have
randomized whether the intervention is delivered online (via emails) or oﬄine
(via letters). The work on delivery reflects the increasing importance of how
salient a message or price is to the consumer (Chetty et al., 2009), and how
much attention they place on that message or price.
Thirdly, it is currently unknown how financial rewards can change energy
behavior, and how such rewards interact with such social norms. Understanding
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the most cost-effective level of financial incentives to change different types of
behavior is a largely untapped area (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Gneezy et
al., 2011). There are very few natural field experiments that have attempted
to understand how important rewards are when the rewards are traditionally
absent from such behaviors. Monetary rewards can influence behavior through
both a direct price effect and an indirect psychological effect, which may not
work in the same direction (Gneezy et al., 2011). The former effect incentivizes
the rewarded behavior by increasing its financial appeal, while the latter effect
can work in both directions depending on the signals it sends about the given
behavior. Benabou & Tirole (2006) modeled individual utility from performance
of a behavior as a function of extrinsic rewards, public or personal image, and
enjoyment from the activity. It is clear that when the reward provides a signal
that the current behavior is seen as undesirable from a norm perspective, people
may treat the reward as a bribe to change their behavior in accordance with
the norm. When the reward is absent from a norm, the target may seem less
like a bribe and more of a basic financial incentive.
Interestingly, the framing of the behavior and the norm may affect the impact
of incentives. Heyman & Ariely (2004) showed that monetary incentives in a
laboratory experiment altered perceptions of the rewarded behavior, decreasing
the behaviors social value by increasing its private value. Similarly, it is possible
that monetary rewards alter recipients beliefs about social norms, as recipients
may view incentives as necessary to overcome a countervailing norm (see also
Fuster & Meier, 2010). One of our natural field experiments (NFEs) is the first
to randomise financial rewards for energy conservation. We also interact such
rewards with social norms to understand their additive effects.
So our first NFE is the first to test social norms on their own and the impact
of information in combination with the norms. The second NFE is the first
to understand how financial rewards impact on such behaviors when the social
norm is both present and absent. We also test whether social norms information
is motivating the change in behavior per se, or whether there is motivations to
be energy efficient is driving the results. We also test the generalizability of
social norms with respect to the mode of delivery – i.e. oﬄine versus online.
For the first NFE, we used daily energy consumption from a natural field
experiment (see Harrison & List, 2004) during 2010-2012. We use 569 house-
holds and randomize them into three groups: (i) control with a basic energy
statement; (ii) treatment 1 – norms only; (iii) treatment 2 – norms with infor-
mation. The control group had a basic energy statement, and the norms only
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group had the basic statement with a bar graph illustrating their consumption
in comparison to the average in their neighborhood for their property size – the
descriptive social norm. So our definition of social norms here is the average
consumption of similar sized properties in the neighborhood. This definition is
similar to that used in the recent literature (see Goldstein et al., 2008; Postle-
waite, 2010; Allcott, 2011; Benabou & Tirole, 2011; Herbrich et al., 2011), but it
must be noted that the norm in our study is not present to enforce cooperation
(Axelrod, 1986) or to sanction those who do not behave according to the norm
(see Fehr & Gaechter, 2002).
The norms with information group had the same social norm statement,
but on the back of the statement was basic information demonstrating how to
change their behavior to increase their knowledge. This information was very
rudimentary in terms of consumer energy knowledge, and it is information that
they may have already seen when their energy controls were installed.
It is important to note that we have two further important differences to
the previous literature on social norms and energy use. Firstly, our statements
are households actual energy statements. Allcott (2011) and Allcott & Rodgers
(2012) use the social norm intervention provided and implemented by OPower
(opower.com), which is the Home Energy Report (HER), but these are sent sep-
arate to the energy statement from their utility company. Secondly, our control
group has an energy statement, although they do not have the social norm infor-
mation. The control group in the previous studies does not have a HER. So we
need to understand the impact that social norms have when everyone receives
the energy statement. It might be that the HER is a treatment in itself and is
delivering the change as opposed to the social norm information itself. More-
over, when people have the HER they might believe that their consumption is
being watched, which might trigger a Hawthorne effect, irrespective of the social
norm. So the previous literature has not shown the impact of social norms only
on behavior. These are important methodological issues in examining the role
of non-pecuniary incentives in changing behavior.
We started reading the energy (gas) meters in October 2010, and have con-
sumption data per day until March 2012. We randomized households by their
consumption in October 2010. The first intervention took place in December
2010 (high energy season), the second intervention took place in June 2011 (low
energy season), and the third took place in January 2012 (high energy season).
For each intervention time period the treatments were identical and the house-
holds remained in the same groups for the study period. Using these data, we
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find some striking results.
Firstly, both treatment groups reduce their consumption, so norms only and
norms with information reduce consumption overall. Secondly, the norms with
information effect size is at least twice as large as the norms only effect size in the
first month. We demonstrate however that norms only does work as well over
the long-term in terms of changing energy behavior. The ’norms only’ groups
seemed to have caught up with the ’norms with information’ group over the 15
month treatment period. Norms work well even when basic information on how
to change behavior accompanies the norm statement. Thirdly, the social norm
treatment works instantaneously on behavior. The first day that people receive
the energy statements is the day with the largest per day behavior change. This
suggests that while norms might decay over time, they require little learning
or feedback they seem to be an instant attention grabber. Given our high
frequency field experiment, we are one of the first to show the abrupt behavioral
response to social norms. Fourthly, those who are above the social norm are
more likely to change their behavior than those below the social norm.
For the second NFE, we used monthly energy consumption involving 2,142
private households during 2012. These households were First Utility energy
customers in the U.K. and they receive billing information from the supplier by
email – so they are used to information being delivered online. We randomized
households into one of eight groups: (i) control (ii) online (i.e. email) social
norm; (iii) oﬄine (i.e. letter) social norm; (iv) high-user frame (online); (v)
high-user frame with social norm (online); (vi) social norm and £10 incentive
for reaching an exogenous target (online); (vii) social norm and £100 incentive
for reaching an exogenous target (online); (viii) £100 incentive for reaching an
exogenous target (online). This will allow us to test social norms and how they
interact with the mode of delivery, high-user frame, and financial rewards. The
importance of comparing (iv) and (v) will demonstrate whether the norm is
related to being energy inefficient, in that we notify individuals that they are
a high end user to determine whether this is any different to a norm (even
though social averages are not used). The importance of (vi), (vii) and (viii)
will demonstrate whetherfinancial rewards help or hinder social norms for energy
conservation.
Using 2,142 households over a four-month experimental period, we demon-
strate four important findings. Firstly, we show that oﬄine social norms work
better than online social norms. This is surprising given that these customers
are used to information being delivered online. It is also surprising given the
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unequivocal impact that norms have in an oﬄine delivery mode. Secondly, we
show that basic monetary rewards (given online) have a large effect on reducing
energy consumption (0.35σ) both in the two-month treatment period, and the
two-month post treatment period, which demonstrates no crowding out effect
of monetary incentives over time. Thirdly, the interaction of social norms with
basic monetary incentives, however, has no effect on energy consumption. This
suggests that there may be a crowding out effect of placing social norms in the
same frame as financial incentives, in that they are not complementary and can
even backfire. Given the large effect of financial incentives, it is clear that social
norms crowd out any extrinsic reason to reduce energy consumption. Fourthly,
we demonstrate that providing online information stating that they (i.e. the
consumers) are inefficient users of energy had no impact on energy behavior. So
we can rule out a Becker-type household production argument against norms.
Such an argument would be that consumers care about saving money on their
energy bill, and when they are informed that they are a high end user, suggest-
ing that they are inefficient, they might realize that they are not saving enough
money through energy.
Taking these two natural field experiments together, our research suggests
that: social descriptive norms can only be used to change long-term energy
behavior when delivered oﬄine; descriptive norms delivered online via emails
do not work; descriptive norms and financial incentives are a different con-
cept to being informed about energy inefficiency; and social norms crowd out
the positive effects of financial rewards on energy consumption. The first re-
sult demonstrates the constructive power of social norms, and the third result
demonstrates the destructive power of social norms. Financial incentives can
change long-term energy behavior, with no crowding out of the behavior once
the rewards have been removed.
The next section will outline the theoretical framework of using norms and
financial incentives for energy conservation. Section 3 will introduce the field
experiments, and will provide details on the treatments used and the data that
are gathered. The results will be presented in section 4 for both natural field
experiments. We will also price the treatment effects from this study to under-
stand the benefit-cost ratios for each intervention. We will then discuss these
results in section 5 and highlight the implications they have for public policy.
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2 Theoretical framework
From the outset, we will assume that people care about norms, and their relative
position away from the norm, and that these enter peoples deep utility functions
(see the evidence in Akerlof, 1982; Jones, 1984; Frank, 1985; Okuno-Fujiwara
& Postlewaite, 1995; Ball et al., 2001; Arrow et al., 2004; Luttmer, 2005; Bault
et al., 2008; Benabou & Tirole, 2011). One could think of the impact of social
norms more formally by using Levitt and List’s (2006) framework. The payoff
for each individual in our model depends on the benefits of consuming energy
(i.e. cooking, washing, heating), the costs of consumption (i.e. price), and the
utility demand from the social norm. The benefit term bi(gi) is increasing in
the amount of gas consumed. Each person also has a cost of consuming gas,
which is the market price, pi, where the cost becomes ci(gi,pi).The consumers
also derive utility from being below the norm and lose utility from being above
the norm. The utility from the norm depends on how much gi is consumed,
and how much the norm consumes g¯. This becomes ni(gi,g¯i), but we also have
an additional saliency of information term, I, that makes the norm information
transferable into small behaviors, ni(gi,g¯i)I.
So people choose their gas consumption simultaneously to maximize the
payoff:
u(gi) = maxg[bi(gi)− ci(pi, gi) + n1i (gi, g¯) + n2i (gi, g¯).I (1)
We would like to examine the function of n1 and n2. The function can
be negative when people want to do better than their neighbors, but it can
be positive when their gas consumption is lower than average so people want
to increase consumption to conform to the norm. Or it might be that some
individuals only care about their financial payoff from the gas consumption,
bi(gi) - ci(gi,pi), but not the norm.
Our first experiment allows us to robustly test the impact of the n functions,
by randomizing across three groups: no one with the norm or information; norm
only; norm and basic information. Those who are not told about the norm
form a belief of how much gas they want to consume based on the available
information and prior experience. The price of gas is fixed into the future (as
it is a public utility) and individuals know this price ex ante, so there is no
uncertainty in the price of future gas in the next time period. The norms only
group firstly chooses their gas based on a prior belief of gas against the norm.
The second group learnt about the norm and how far they are from it, and
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adjust their gas consumption based on the update. The norms with information
group have the basic information made salient by being on the norm statement,
and this information provides knowledge of the infrastructure in their home
that allows them to change their gas consumption (i.e. inputs to the energy
production function).
Overall, the norm could be a good update, in that your position against the
norm was better than the prior belief. So we can denote α(gi,g¯i;gi≤g¯i) to be
the marginal change in gas consumption where there is a good update. The
use of injunctive norm will notify individuals that they are behaving in a good
way. If the update is bad (i.e. above the norm or worse than expected), then
we have β(gi,g¯i;gi>g¯i). By intuition of the descriptive norm of β, we expect
this to have a dampening effect on consumption. The salient basic information
will allow individuals to change their behavior if they want to conform to the
norm. When I = 0, then we are left with either α or β. When I = 1, then we
have two marginal effects as above. We can denote χ(gi,g¯i;gi≤g¯i|I) to be the
marginal change in gas consumption where there is a good update with basic
information. If the update is bad, then we have φ(gi,g¯i;gi>g¯i|I).
The utility function of each individual is therefore:
ui(g) = b(gi)− p(gi) + αgDα + βgDβ + χgDχ + φgDφ (2)
where b is the benefit from gas consumption (i.e. heating, cooking, washing),
Dα=1 when gi≤g¯i and no basic information is provided, and zero otherwise.
Dβ=1 when gi>g¯i and no basic information is provided, and zero otherwise;
Dχ=1 when gi≤g¯i and basic information is provided, and zero otherwise; and
Dφ=1 when gi>g¯i and basic information is provided, and zero otherwise. When
we have norms only, the optimal level of gas to maximize utility is:
g*i = b - p + α if gi≤g¯i
g*i = b - p + β if gi>g¯i
When we have norms and basic information, we have:
g*i = b - p + χ if gi≤g¯i
g*i = b - p + φ if gi>g¯i
We will assume that, due to both the descriptive norms and the injunctive
norms, α and χ are both negative i.e. there is an acceleration effect of even less
consumption and that β and φ are also negative i.e. an encouragement effect
to reduce consumption to conform to the norm.
The studies to date though, have made the social norm salient through the
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Home Energy Reports (see Allcott, 2011), and the average effect across con-
sumers is that the χ and φ of the utility function reduces energy consumption
by approximately 2-3%. What is missing here, as explained above, is the ability
of the person to understand how to transform that norm into observable be-
havior change. Therefore the norm has to be accompanied by the information
to actually change behavior. This information parameter might include peo-
ples cognitive skills, which allows the individual to understand what the norm
actually means and whether it is a good or bad thing socially.
We will test the equality of effects in these utility functions using our first
natural field experiment. The null hypothesis of no impact of norms on utility
is what we initially test, i.e. α = β = 0, and then we test the null of no impact
of norms and basic information on utility, i.e. χ = φ = 0 . Comparing the
marginal effects against one another allows us to examine the impact of basic
information itself on gas consumption. Importantly for our first NFE, we will
be interested in the differences between the same treatment coefficients. So we
will test two equalities: α = χ and β = φ. The former will test the importance
of information for people consuming below norm energy, and the latter will test
the importance of information for people consuming above norm energy.
For the impact of the salience of the social norm, inefficient frames, and
financial rewards, we can be a little more specific. We know very little about
the mode of delivery of the norms and the impact of rewards in conjunction
with the norms. Furthermore, the effect of norms on utility is dependent upon
the households knowledge of the norm. To incorporate such knowledge into the
model, we include a term to represent the salience of or attention to the norm,
as follows:
ui(g) = b(gi)− ci(gi, pi) + [1− θ(s, o)]ni(gi, g¯) (3)
where θ ∈ [0,1] represents the degree of inattention, which is a function of
salience, s, and other competing stimuli, o (as in DellaVigna, 2009). The inat-
tention term, θ, simply captures the degree to which the individuals attention
is directed toward the norm (where θ = 0 represents full attention). If it is the
case that oﬄine norm information is more salient, then θ will be lower for those
receiving norms information oﬄine as opposed to online; therefore, for those
receiving the norm oﬄine, the effect of norms on energy consumption would be
greater.
Within this framework, norms can be distinguished from a Becker-type
model of household production, in that norms may be a frame that notifies
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people that they are inefficient users of energy. We provide a treatment frame
of high-energy user only and then interact that with a social norm. When
rewards are possible, the receipt of monetary incentives affects households ex-
pected utility. Including rewards in the utility function, we have:
ui(g) = b(gi)− ci(gi, pi) + [1− θ(s, o)]ni(gi, g¯) + r(gi, g¯) (4)
where r represents monetary rewards for reaching target consumption and is a
function of a households consumption and the given norm. Similar to the effect
of norms, r will yield positive utility if the households consumption reaches the
target consumption (here, the norm), but will yield no utility otherwise.
If we assume that norms and financial rewards operate independently from
each other, the above utility function is complete. On the other hand, if these
mechanisms elicit different behaviors in combination than they do indepen-
dently, an additional parameter is necessary:
ui(g) = b(gi)− ci(gi, pi) + [1− θ(s, o)]ni(gi, g¯) + ri(gi, g¯) + κi(.) (5)
where κ represents an interaction effect between social norms and rewards.
In statistical terms, it represents the coefficient on the interaction term n(gi,g¯)
× r(gi,g¯). There is no existing literature on the relations between norms and
incentives, so its effect is thus far theoretically ambiguous.
Accordingly, we have the following partial derivatives:
∂ui(gi)/∂bi(gi) > 0 (6)
∂ui(gi)/∂ci(gi) > 0 (7)
If gi < g¯:
∂ui(gi)/∂ni(gi, g¯) > 0 (8)
∂ui(gi)/∂ri(gi, g¯) > 0 (9)
If gi > g¯:
∂ui(gi)/∂ni(gi, g¯) < 0 (10)
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∂ui(gi)/∂ri(gi, g¯) = 0 (11)
We subsequently obtain:
∂ui(gi)/∂κ > ∂ui(gi)/∂ni(gi, g¯) = 0 (12)
∂ui(gi)/∂κ > ∂ui(gi)/∂ri(gi, g¯) = 0 (13)
The partial derivatives in (6) and (7) capture the positive and negative effects
of increases in benefits and costs (respectively) on household utility. Since all
of the individuals sampled in the second field experiment consume more than
the average customer, the social norm information should theoretically have a
negative impact on utility and enhance effort to reduce energy consumption ei;
assuming oﬄine norms are more salient, the norm effect in (8) and (9) may be
stronger for those receiving norm information oﬄine rather than online in the
first experimental subgroup described in the next section.
Moreover, since incentives increase the expected utility of reducing energy
consumption in (10) and (11), rewards should increase effort to reduce con-
sumption as well. Therefore, if the norm and incentive mechanisms operate
independently from each other, those with both social norms information and
rewards are expected to achieve the highest energy reductions, as shown by (12)
and (13). Additionally, higher rewards should yield greater reductions; as such
rewards will exceed more individuals marginal cost of efforts to reduce energy
consumption. We expect however that given the direction of change from both
social norms and financial rewards independently, their effect when combined
should also have a reducing impact on energy consumption.
3 Methodology
3.1 First NFE
We use a large housing estate owned by Camden Council, London, that was
recently re-developed to meet energy efficiency standards. The estate received
individual gas boilers with zonal controls, double-glazing, and external wall
insulation. There are a total of 569 households that have been redeveloped and
used in this experiment. The completed metered system provides gas from a
communal source, and the installation of individual controls (thermostats and
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programmers) in each property gives residents full control over when and how
they use gas for heating, cooking, and hot water. These were all installed in mid-
2010. Individuals pay for their energy at a subsidized rate of 2.5p/kWh – this
is extremely low (due to subsidization) and significantly well below the market
price. We were able to remotely read gas consumption per day anonymously for
each property. These households were selected by the Council and there was no
self-selection onto this heating scheme.
We use a standard randomization process for our natural field experiment
(see Harrison & List, 2004). We created six cells with the same number of people
in each of the six cells these are described in Table 1. We took the average of the
overall sample and split them into two groups: high users (above the norm); low
users (below the norm). Then we unconditionally randomized the households
into the three groups based on their consumption in November 2010, and the
treatment started on the December 22, 2010. The actual numbers of households,
their mean consumption, and the standard deviations are presented in Table 2.
There were no significant differences between the treatment and control groups
in terms of their baseline mean gas consumption. All of the energy statements
were sent out by Camden Council and were received by all households on the
same day.
We use both descriptive and injunctive norms for this experiment. The
descriptive norm element comes in the form of a household’s energy use that is
compared to that of its neighbors. This is represented by the bar graph, where
households are either below or above average consumption, and the length of
the bar on the statement measures this difference.
Due to the fact that descriptive norms do not signal good and bad behav-
iors, it has been claimed that people who were below the norm use more energy
– called the boomerang effect (Clee & Wicklund, 1980). The experiment by
Schultz et al. (2007) used injunctive norms to mitigate the boomerang effect.
These included ’smiley faces’ (or emoticons) on the descriptive norm feedback
reports given to these relatively low users, although Allcott (2011) questions
their importance. Nonetheless, we used smiley faces for only those residents
below the norm (i.e. groups C and E), and for group C a statement saying
’Congratulations. You are an energy efficient consumer.’ and for group E ’Con-
gratulations. You are an energy efficient consumer. On the back of this state-
ment recommends ways for you to carry on saving energy and money.’. Those
who were above the norm did not have a face (either happy or unhappy). They
also did not have any injunctive language suggesting that they were behaving
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inefficiently on the statement.
The basic information given to the norms with information group did not
specifically mention how much energy they would save with the small behaviors.
There was also no measure of cost or effort needed for these small behaviors. The
’norms only’ treatment is different from the basic information provided, since
in the norm statement, there is no information about how they can change
their energy behaviors. Moreover, the basic information has no social norm or
pressure element. We carefully framed the information so there is no reference to
desired behavior from a societal point of view. While the consumers in our study
were freely allowed to believe that the basic steps to change their behavior were
easy steps to conform to the norm, there was no reference to what the desired
behavior was.
We do need to address the issue of contamination of the control group by the
treatment group. There are five important reasons that allow us to argue that
contamination is not generating important biases in the estimated treatment
effects. Firstly, people did not know that there was an experiment and were
not told at any point that their energy was being monitored for any research or
experimental purposes. Secondly, the energy statements were private, i.e. not
at all public. If people in the study talked to other people in the study, they: (a)
would not know that they potentially had a different energy statement; and (b)
might not necessarily talk about their energy bills. Thirdly, our energy state-
ments were household specific, and the norms presented were based on similar
sized properties. Peoples neighbors live in different sized households, so they
would have different norms. Fourthly, and shown in our empirical section, the
largest treatment effects from our study happen on the day that residents receive
the energy statement, before any communication can realistically take place. So
contamination would not in this case cause an inflation of the treatment effect.
Fifthly, the interaction term between the treatment variables and the variable
measuring the proportion of treated neighbors is not significant. This propor-
tion of treated neighbors is the proportion of the seven closest neighbors that are
treated for each individual household. Thus we do not find any contamination
effects.
Due to the structure of our dataset, we can run a panel model and ascertain
a treatment effect through a difference-in-difference specification:
Git = β.Pit+ τ1(T1i x Pit) + τ2(T2i x Pit) + ui + it
where Git is the gas consumption (measured in cubic meters) of the indi-
vidual household, i, per day, t. τ1 is the average treatment affect for the norms
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only group, and τ2 is the average treatment effect for the norms with informa-
tion group. This specification will model energy use conditional on treatment
groups (T1i and T2i), post-treatment indicator (Pit), and household fixed ef-
fects ui. This specification is estimated in OLS using the standard fixed effects
estimator, using robust standard errors clustered by household to be consistent
with any correlation in the errors within households over the study duration
(Bertrand et al., 2004). We do not have to account for attrition or selection
effects since no one can opt out of the treatment, and no one moved property
in the research period. We see this as a very tight natural field experiment.
We will also examine the possible boomerang effects by segmenting the above
and below norm users, and we include deviation terms to determine the effects
of the treatments as consumers get further away from the social norm. We will
also examine heterogeneity to the treatment using the background variables that
may impact energy consumption. We have detailed data on size of property
(using number of bedrooms as a proxy for household size), asset wealth (i.e.
whether they own their property – leaseholder – or whether they are a social
tenant), gender of the head of household, and age of the head of household. We
also control for daily temperature from the nearest weather station, which is
situated less than one kilometer away.
3.2 Second NFE
The second NFE consists of First Utility customers in the U.K. that consume
more electricity than the average of all First Utility customers but are not in
the extreme tail of the distribution. In other words, subjects in the experiment
use more energy than average. The sample is stratified into four subgroups
based on energy consumption over the three months prior to the intervention.
This stratification of experimental subjects essentially yields a dataset that can
be divided into four smaller experiments; three of which contain two treatment
groups and one of which contains a single treatment group, and each with its
own corresponding control group (see Table 3). Stratification allows for sort-
ing on energy consumption (a continuous variable), which enables selection of
subgroups of First Utility customers with minimal variance of the dependent
variable and randomization within subgroups (List et al., 2009). Due to the
variance in consumption being reduced, we can use smaller samples to detect
treatment effects. the control period was January 2012 to March 2012, and the
treatment period was April 2012 to May 2012, amnd we measured consumption
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until the end of July 2012.
The first subgroup (Subgroup 1) consists of 676 households whose energy
consumption ranges from 1100-1850kWh for the control period, and its purpose
is to isolate the effect of receiving social norms information in both online (i.e.
emails) and oﬄine (i.e. posted letters) formats. This subsample is the only
one in which some subjects receive energy bills oﬄine. They received the same
statements as those used in the first experiment.
Subgroup 2 is comprised of 608 households in the consumption range of 1160-
1970 kWh from January 2012 through March 2012. In both treatment groups,
households receive a message that their household consumption is above the
norm, while those in only one treatment group also receive information on what
the norm is (in kWh) so that they may compare their own consumption to the
average. This high-end user frame told households how much they consumed,
and then stated ’This consumption would be regarded as HIGH for your prop-
erty type.’
Subgroup 3 compares 539 households with consumption between 1350-2000kWh
in the control period to discern the effect of receiving social norm information in
addition to a financial incentive to reduce their consumption over the next two
months (predicted using the previous three months consumption) by 30%. The
reward is £100 in one treatment group five and £10 in treatment group six. The
final subgroup (Subgroup 4) contains 319 households with consumption levels
in the range of 1500-2100kWh from January 2012 through March 2012, and
this treatment group is offered a reward of £100 for 30% reduction without any
social norm disclosure. the reward was framed as: ’To encourage you to save
energy, we would like to offer you an incentive. If you can keep below [target]
kWh over the next two months (April 2012 May 2012) so that your electric
usage is more in line with the average consumption of other similar homes, then
we will reward you with 100!’.
To randomize the 2,142 households, we first created four subgroups with
monthly pre-treatment consumption means close to 475kWh, 525kWh, 575kWh,
and 615kWh. By centering each group upon a different mean instead of ran-
domizing around the mean of the entire sample, we decreased the variance in
the four subgroups in order to detect the same size treatment effect with smaller
sample sizes. To ensure that no subject belonged to more than one treatment
or control group, we defined groups in the following way. First, we chose people
whose pre-treatment consumption ranged from 1100-1850kWh and randomized
91 households into Treatment Group 1 and 86 into Treatment Group 2. Sec-
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ond, we identified households who consumed 1160-1970kWh and randomized
90 into Treatment Group 3 and 89 into Treatment Group 4. Third, we chose
households whose consumption ranged from 1350-2000kWh and randomized 84
to receive Treatment 5 and 87 to receive Treatment 6. Lastly, we randomized
75 households in the range of 1500-2100kWh into Treatment Group 7.
We randomized households into four subgroups using a random number gen-
erator and did this only once before achieving balance. We subsequently gener-
ated t-tests to ensure that there was no difference of means (i.e. balance) within
any subgroup at the 10% significance level (as shown in Table 4); this process
ensures that the treatment groups have been properly randomized.
Our conjectures are that:
Conjecture 1: Social norms information will cause high using subjects to
consume less energy. This effect will be enhanced by the salience of the infor-
mation, which is expected to be higher for those receiving the norms oﬄine (i.e.
letter) as opposed to online (i.e. email).
Conjecture 2: Learning that one is a ’high-end user’ will cause a reduction
in energy consumption. For those who are told the norm in addition to their
’high-end user’ status, their reductions will depend on their own consumption
relative to the norm.
Conjecture 3: When financial incentives are included with social norms in-
formation, energy reductions will be higher than when social norms are given
on their own. In addition, the high (i.e. £100) reward will induce higher effort
to reduce energy consumption than will the low (i.e. £10) reward.
Conjecture 4: Financial rewards on their own will achieve significant energy
reductions, though not quite as high as if social norms information were also
involved. This hypothesis assumes that social norms and financial incentives
operate independently and therefore have an additive effect. If, instead, intrin-
sic motivation is important, the crowding out effect may mean that financial
incentives will be more effective in isolation.
4 Results
4.1 First experiment
We provide data on 569 households from the start of October 2010 to March
2012. The results are provided in three main sections. The first analyzes the
individual level daily data across the whole time period. The second examines
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the robustness of the results to time-varying characteristics, and provides tests
of heterogeneity based on personal characteristics. The third summarises the
results in terms of its comparison to the elasticity of demand, and the actual
energy, money and carbon saved as a result of the intervention.
Table 5 illustrates the fixed effects regressions for two months worth of daily
data – one month pre-treatment and one month post-treatment. The difference-
in-difference estimators are (Post * Treat1), which is norms only, and (Post *
Treat2), which is norms with information. It is clear that both difference-in-
difference coefficients are negative and significant in the basic econometric spec-
ification (1). Once we control for daily temperature (2) and the correlation of the
error within households over time (3), we find that the difference-in-difference
coefficients do not change. But the standard errors increase when we cluster the
standard errors, suggesting a correlation in the error within households across
time. The norms only treatment does not remain significant at the ten per cent
level once we cluster the standard errors.
To work out these effect size, we need to show the impact against the behav-
ior of the control group post treatment. The control group post treatment until
the end of January consumed on average 4.068m3 of gas per day. The norms
only effect size across these four regressions is around -0.18, suggesting an aver-
age treatment effect of 4.4%. With our norms with information effect size being
around -0.44, the short-term effect of this treatment on energy consumption is
10.8%.
Column (1) of Table 6 examines only one treatment day – i.e. the first
treatment day (December 23, 2010). So this will examine the behavior straight
after the treatment has been given. It is clear that the effect size is very large
for this one day of treatment. The treatment effect for norms only is 11.7%
(0.18σ), and the norms with information treatment effect is 15.4% (0.25σ).
The other specifications in Table 6 examine longer time periods for both pre
and post intervention. This is to provide some sensitivity over the control period
used, and to examine the durability of these treatment effects. Increasing the
post-treatment time period to February 2011 (two months) in specification (2),
we find that the treatment coefficient is estimated at -0.366. The control con-
sumption across the post intervention period was 3.808m3 per day. Therefore,
the average treatment effect for norms only and norms with information are
2.9% and 9.6% respectively. Specification (4) includes the Share variable, which
denotes the proportion of the closest seven neighbors that are in a treatment
group. By interacting this with both treatments, we find negligible effects, which
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allows us to rule out any contamination of the treatment to other households
(as referred to in section 3).
Specification (7) analyses the whole dataset with respect to time (i.e. Octo-
ber 2010 to March 2012). We find we find that the treatment effect for groups
1 and 2 are 7% (0.03σ) and 6% (0.03σ) respectively. These effects are quite
similar to that found for the few months, but the standard deviation effect sizes
are smaller due to greater variance in 18 months gas consumption. We observe
that when we examine the impact of the three interventions (dec2010, June2011,
Jan2012), we find that ’norms only’ catches up with the ’norms with informa-
tion’ treatment. Actually, giving information with the norms has a coeffiicient
of -0.161 while the ’norms only’ has a coefficient of -0.195. This suggests that
the extra information that might have increased knowledge does not produice
any beneficial effects over the long-run. For the shorter time period in specifi-
cation (6) (examining a month before and a month after the third intervention
period), we find that the treatment effects for groups 1 and 2 are 8% (0.1σ) and
5% (0.06σ) (the difference is p=0.38) respectively. This evidence points to the
fact that norms on their own actively increases energy conservation.
We now examine those individuals who were above and below the norm
separately. We will split the data and analysis into those above and below
respectively. Table 7 presents four specifications. The first two represent above
norm customers only and the second two represent the below norm customers,
with regressions (1) and (3) examining the whole time period and regressions
(2) and (4) examining the last intervention in January 2012. Firstly, there are
no significant differences between the two treatments for those above the norm
for the whole experimental duration. Secondly, the treatments did not have an
effect for those below the norm over the whole experimental period. This is
consistent with Allcott (2011). The last treatment did seem to have an initial
impact on those who received the norms only and not on those who received
norms plus information.
Table 8 presents the heterogeneous interactions with the treatments across
the whole sample period. As mentioned above, we will examine the impact of
the treatments based on household size, asset wealth, age, and gender of the
head of household. Specification (1) shows that larger households are more re-
sponsive to both treatments than those from smaller households, but larger for
the ’norms only’ group. Specification (2) clearly shows that the more wealthy
households are less responsive to the norms with information treatment than
the less wealthy households. Specification (3) shows that the age of the head of
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the household has no effect on the treatments. Specification (4) demonstrates
that males are much less responsive to norms only than females – the difference
being around 0.400m3 of energy consumption per day. Once we control for these
background variables in specification (5), the only variable that remains impor-
tant is size of property. Interestingly, once we control for baseline consumption
in specification (6), the results do not change. The coefficients on the variable
to denote whether a household is under consumption are positive, suggesting
that those under the above are more likely to change their behavior, once we
control for background characteristics.
Within this section, we examine the differences in consumption in terms
of the elasticity of demand, money saved, and the carbon saved. Firstly, it is
important to examine what type of price increases would be equivalent to such
a short-term change in consumption across the sample. Many of the studies
examining the price elasticity of energy demand for households around the world
provide an estimate of around -0.1 to -0.3 (Lijesen, 2007). These are the similar
values used by the UK Governments long-term projections (CCC, 2008a). Using
the range estimate above for the short-run elasticity, we can estimate the price
equivalent effect of the social norm. Using our 7% estimate of the norms with
information treatment effect, this would be equivalent to increasing short-term
energy prices by around 20% to 60%. Given that energy is fairly price-inelastic,
our comparable estimates are very large. This is especially so given that the
treatment is only one letter sent by the Council.
Our norms only treatment effect being -0.195m3 per day over 15 months (450
days), the cumulative energy reduction per household is 87.75m3 of gas. The
conversion factor is 1m3 = 11.4kWh, so each household reduced their consump-
tion by 1000kWh over this time period on average. For the monetary value, each
kWh is charged to these households at around £0.025. So during the project
time frame, the interventions saved the average resident around £25. For our
norms with information sample, they saved around £4,725 altogether. If we use
market gas prices, which is currently around £0.09 per kWh, the amount saved
per resident would be around £90, with an overall saving of £17,000 for the
whole experimental group.
For carbon dioxide, we know that 1000kWh is equal to 0.18322 tons of carbon
dioxide (DEFRA, 2011). Thus, we saved around 0.18 tons of carbon dioxide per
household. If the current market value of carbon dioxide per ton is £40 (CCC,
2008b), then the external cost saved in this case is £7.20 per household. These
private and social costs are large given that the cost of the intervention per
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household was less than £3, so for each £1 spent, we saved 333kWh. In fact,
such saving is the most cost-effective way to conserve energy around the world
(see Policy Exchange, 2013).
4.2 Second experiment
We will present the individual level results from the second NFE here, and price
the results as we develop the specifications. The dataset we acquired from First
Utility was anonymized and had no household level information, so we do not
discuss any heterogeneity of our treatments. We will discuss the results by each
subgroup as in the methodology section. The results stem from data on 2,142
households from the beginning of January 2012 through July 2012, with the
intervention starting on April 2, 2012, for all treatment groups. The following
four tables (Tables 9-12) report the results of the regressions for several post-
treatment months to allow for detection of decay and persistence effects after
removal of the treatment. Each table shows the results of the four subgroups
where all regressions include dummies for each treatment group, interactions
between each treatment group and the post-treatment dummy, and the post-
treatment dummy on its own.
Table 9 provides the effect of oﬄine social norms and online norms, versus
the control group. The first column of Table 9 shows the results of the regression
described above for Subgroup 1 only; that is, the pre-treatment period consti-
tutes January-March 2012 and the post-treatment period is from April 2012
onwards. The regressions yield some very interesting results. With respect to
the medium through which subjects receive social norms information, it seems
that oﬄine norms can have a higher effect on conservation than online norms,
although the difference is not significant at the ten per cent level. Oﬄine social
norms have a negative effect on energy consumption, which is significant to the
5% level for both July on its own as well as the two-month period of June and
July. The oﬄine norm reduces average energy consumption in July by 5.73%
or 0.22σ compared to the control group. These results support what is found
in the first natural field experiment in this paper. Oﬄine social norms have a
higher effect on conservation only once we examine the long-term — specifica-
tion (3). This difference is significantly different to the online social norm group
(p<0.05).
Using the same demand elasticity as above, the oﬄine norm has the equiva-
lent effect of an increase in short-term energy prices of 13 to 39% for June and
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July together. In terms of carbon savings for July, we first multiply the aver-
age monthly kWh reduction (15kWh) by the treatment group size (n=86) to
calculate the total kWh savings of 1,290 kWh. Since 1000kWh of energy usage
emits 0.183 tons of carbon dioxide, the oﬄine social norm treatment saved 0.47
tons of carbon dioxide in the months of June and July alone. Contrary to its
oﬄine counterpart, the online norm appears to have little to no effect on energy
consumption; the coefficient for oﬄine norms is, in fact, positive (though not sig-
nificant) for most post-treatment months. This results supports organizations,
such as Opower, using oﬄine methods to conserve energy.
Table 10 presents the energy inefficient frame results — i.e. ’high-end user’.
As we can clearly see, the ’high-user’ frame (treatment group 3) has positive
coefficients throughout, which suggests that it increases energy consumption
(although none significant at the ten per cent level). This clearly does point
toward the interpretation that social norms are very different from being notified
that the household is a high user and therefore is acting inefficiently. In fact,
when social norms are used in addition to high-end user, these coefficients reduce
but none are significantly different from one another. This does point to the
fact that notifying people that they are a high-end user does not make them
conserve energy.
Perhaps the most interesting findings are those associated with social norms,
financial incentives, and their interaction. In accordance with standard the-
ory, large financial incentives (e.g. £100 reward) decrease consumption for all
post-treatment months at the 5% significance level and even at the 1% level
for regressions in some post-treatment months see table 12. The difference
in difference coefficients for the June-July regression are highly negative and
significant to the 1% level, a result that shows persistent effects of financial
incentives (i.e. no crowding-out effect). Two t-tests comparing the coefficients
for April-May to those for June-July show no signs of decay (p=0.89).
The interaction between social norms information and small monetary in-
centives (i.e. £10 rewards) appears to be mildly counterproductive, as indi-
cated by the positive coefficients for the interaction of Treatment 6 with the
post-treatment dummy in Table 11. In fact, the interaction of norms with the
smaller incentive is highly counterproductive for those below the pre-treatment
consumption mean in Treatment 6 (575kWh for January-March); the difference-
in-difference coefficient is 16.2 (p<0.05). A t-test shows that these coefficients
are statistically different from each other (p<0.05). This suggests that giving a
£100 reward had a better effect of reducing consumption than £10.
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The immediate effect of large financial incentives is around 8% (0.35σ) across
all time periods. In regression output units, these reductions are equivalent to
the average monthly energy consumption of 1.8 to 2.4 household LCD televi-
sions (Energy Saving Trust, 2012). Using the method described above, these
energy savings translate to carbon savings of 0.4-0.6 tons per month. These
results suggest that financial incentives do not crowd out energy behaviors in
the future. In fact such rewards crowd in energy behaviors since the reduc-
tion is maintained up until two months after the trial period. Finally, when all
post-treatment months are included in the regression, the effect of the incentive
is to reduce consumption by 7.75% (0.32σ). These average treatment effects
are larger than those found in any previous NFE that aims to alter residential
energy consumption.
It is very interesting to compare treatment groups 5 (£100 reward and social
norms) and 7 (£100 reward). It is difficult to explain from standard theory why
an identical monetary incentive produces no effect when interacted with social
norm information. Not a single coefficient for the Treatment 5 interaction is as
negative or significant as those for Treatment 7, and the coefficients are not con-
sistently positive or negative for all post-treatment months. When comparing
coefficients, we find that the £100 only group has a significantly larger reduction
in energy consumption than £100 plus social norms for all periods (every t-test
has a p-value<0.05). This provides robust evidence that financial rewards to
promote energy conservation can be highly effective, and remain long-lasting
even after the reward has been removed for the individual.
5 Discussion
These two natural field experiments clearly demonstrate that social norms can
change energy behavior. Our research is consistent with the work that has found
that non-pecuniary strategies can have long lasting effects on behavior.
Our first field experiment demonstrates some key results that differ from
previous work in this area. Firstly, we show that social norms work well ir-
respective of basic information. Secondly, we show that social norms work in
addition to a standard energy statement. Thirdly, we show that social norms
can have sustainable effects over a number of months and years after the first
energy statement. This is very interesting given that there were no punishments
or sanctions if people did not conform to the norm, and no covenants were used
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(Ostrom et al., 1992).
We show that social norms have an immediate impact on behavior, and that
this immediate impact is the largest impact, with a slight wane over time. The
immediate impact of social norms with information on consumption is around
0.25σ, which is comparably large to other effect sizes in energy consumption.
This finding suggests that such social norms do not take time to embed within
habits or behaviors. Rather they produce an instantaneous reaction to the treat-
ment, which has implications for the diffusion models of social learning (Young,
2009). We do find some heterogeneity in response to the social norm statements.
Those with larger properties are less likely to reduce their consumption with the
treatment over the long-run. We do not find any strong results for gender and
wealth of the head of household.
Our effect sizes are much larger than those from the U.S. causal studies
(Allcott, 2011; Ferraro & Price, 2011) and correlation studies (Arimura et al.,
2011; Darby, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Reiss & White, 2008; Friedrich et al., 2009).
There are potentially five reasons for the difference. Firstly, we use primarily
social housing where the tenant rents the property from the Council or a private
landlord. The U.S. studies use private households. This is extremely interesting
since our households pay very little for their energy, so you would expect the
effects to be larger when the price of energy is higher. Secondly, our sample
is from the U.K., and not from the U.S. Thirdly, our intervention is on the
actual energy statement from the energy provider. The Opower intervention is
separate from the energy provider statement. Fourthly, our design is somewhat
different. For instance, we do not use the most energy efficient neighbors on the
statement and do not place any other information on the front page apart from
the norm. Fifthly, our households do not have smart meters or in-home displays,
so they did not receive immediate feedback from their behavior change. So it
could be that some in-home displays provide more information than is optimal
to reduce consumption, i.e. some uncertainty in the outcome of the behavior
change may be good for sustaining long-term effects. These five factors might
come together to collectively produce a large difference in the effect sizes found
in different field experiments. Further research should attempt to identify the
differences across various studies.
Our second field experiment further shows the impacts of social norms online
and oﬄine, and how such norms are different to energy inefficiency concerns,
and that when financial rewards are overlaid with social norms we do not find
the positive impact of norm information. We find that social norms only work
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when they are delivered oﬄine via letters through the post, but do not work
when sent by email. This is the first finding of norms working differently for
different modes within the same study.
We do find that the effects of financial rewards for energy conservation to be
large and persistent over time. The energy conservation remains even when the
financial reward is removed. We find however that the strength of the financial
incentive is reduced when social norm information is provided. This differs from
the literature that financial incentives can change the social norm (see Fuster
& Meier, 2010). Energy consumption may be one domain where providing
social norms interact with the price effect. This corroborates the results from
Herberich et al. (2011) where price effects and social norms work on different
margins. Nonetheless, using large financial rewards to motivate energy behavior
change can be long-lasting and cost-effective.
Interestingly, how research suggests that financial rewards do not crowd out
any intrinsic reasons to conserve energy. Though energy-saving behaviors are
similar to charitable giving (Gneezy& Rustichini, 2000) and blood donation
(Titmuss, 1970; Mellstrm & Johannesson, 2008; Lacetera et al., 2012) in certain
respects (i.e. both yield negligible private payoffs relative to their public bene-
fits), public image or reputation is largely irrelevant in the context of residential
energy consumption. Therefore, the extent of intrinsic motivation is likely not
dependent on image motivation and is only a function of ones enjoyment as well
as personal image and beliefs (Ariely et al., 2009). Thus, problems of crowding
out intrinsic motivation due to rewards effects on personal or public image are
likely absent in this study focused on energy consumption.
There are further questions that arise out of this research that we have not
addressed. Firstly, to what extent are there spillovers to other behaviors within
the same household? For instance, if a household saves money on their energy
bills, what do they spend that money on and does this spending offset the ben-
efits (the indirect rebound effect) or increase energy and money savings (e.g.
buying energy efficient light bulbs) (Greening et al., 2000)? Secondly, previous
research on the impact of positional goods suggests that energy is one of the
least visible goods and therefore people do not necessarily compete on energy
(Heffetz, 2011). It would be theoretically and empirically interesting to deter-
mine whether providing information on the norms of other low visible goods,
such as insurance and healthcare, can also have large effects by minimizing in-
correct beliefs about normal behavior (Miller & Prentice, 1994). Answering
these questions will lead to better understanding of the efficacy of pecuniary
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and non-pecuniary incentives on behavior, as well as how they can be used
effectively for policy purposes.
Overall, providing information on the average neighbor can promote energy
conservation. We find that the information on the average is enough to motivate
people to reduce their consumption, and that financial rewards are effective in
reducing consumption, even once they are removed. So we recommend that
governments take such financial incentives and social norms seriously if they
want to change energy consumption.
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Table 1: The groups of the first field experiment
Treatment Above norm 1 Below norm
Control A. Plain energy statement B. Plain energy statement
Intervention 1 C. Plain energy statement + Norms D. Plain energy statement + Norms
Intervention 2 E. Plain energy statement + Norms + Info F. Plain energy statement + Norms + Info
Table 2: The control gas consumption (m3) of the groups - randomization check
Control Intervention1 Intervention2 Average
Above N=95 N=92 N=95 N=282
Mean=5.2 (2.6) Mean=5.3 (2.9) Mean=5.3 (2.9) Mean=5.2 (2.8)
Below N=90 N=93 N=96 N=279
Mean=2.3 (2.0) Mean=2.3 (1.9) Mean=2.3 (2.0) Mean=2.3 (2.0)
Average N=185 N=185 N=191 N=569
Mean=3.7 (2.7) Mean=3.8 (2.9) Mean=3.8 (2.9) Mean=5.0 (2.5)
Note: Standard deviations in parantheses.
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Table 3: Second experiment stratification
Subgroup Treatment groups Consumption (kWh) N
Subgroup 1 1: Online social norm 1098-1833 676
2: Oﬄine social norm
Control 1
Subgroup 2 3: ’High-end user’ 1164-1968 608
4: ’High-end user’ + social norm
Control 2
Subgroup 3 5: £100 reward + social norm 1351-1998 539
5: £10 reward + social norm
Control 3
Subgroup 4 7: £100 reward 1501-2095 319
Control 4
Note: The consumption relates to the three months consump-
tion before the experiment started.
Table 4: Randomization check
Subgroup Treatment groups Consumption (kWh) σ N t-stat
Subgroup 1 TG1 467.7 66.1 91 -0.735 (p=0.46)
TG2 476.9 76.5 86 1.190 (p=0.23)
Control1 471.2 71.9 499
Subgroup 2 TG3 525.6 71.8 90 0.039 (p=0.97)
TG4 522.9 78.7 89 -0.392 (p=0.70)
Control2 525.3 109.0 429
Subgroup 3 TG5 568.8 87.0 84 -0.586 (p=0.56)
TG6 582.5 76.2 87 1.481 (p=0.14)
Control3 572.8 99.3 368
Subgroup 4 TG7 616.1 93.4 75 0.654 (p=0.51)
Control4 611.4 92.8 244
Note: The consumption relates to the average of the three
months consumption before the experiment started. The t-
tests are comparisons with the control in each subgroup.
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Table 5: Gas consumption over December 2010 - January 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-intervention -0.576*** -0.412*** -0.576*** -0.412***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.090) (0.091)
Post * treat1 -0.180*** -0.178*** -0.180 -0.178
(0.052) (0.052) (0.124) (0.124)
Post * treat2 -0.441*** -0.439*** -0.441*** -0.439***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.123) (0.123)
Constant 4.876*** 4.876*** 4.942*** 4.876***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.032) (0.032)
Temperature N Y N Y
Clustered errors N N Y Y
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 34,646 34,646 34,646 34,646
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
Table 6: Gas consumption over different time periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-intervention 0.410*** -0.636*** -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.854*** -0.453***
(0.147) (0.090) (0.075) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074)
Post * treat1 -0.553*** -0.111 -0.120 -0.211 -0.195* -0.280***
(0.209) (0.126) (0.118) (0.240) (0.114) (0.088)
Post * treat2 -0.768*** -0.366*** -0.211*** -0.287 -0.161 -0.170*
(0.206) (0.127) (0.114) (0.233) (0.109) (0.094)
Post * treat1 * share 0.026
(0.058)
Post * treat2 * share 0.020
(0.060)
Constant 4.970*** 4.876*** 4.339*** 4.339*** 3.551*** 3.179***
(0.088) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.016)
Temperature Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01
N 12,989 50,399 117,033 117,033 294,562 79,765
Time frame Dec2010 - Dec2010 - Nov2010 - Nov2010 - Oct2010 - Nov2011 -
one day Feb2011 May2011 May2011 Mar2012 Mar2012
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
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Table 7: Gas consumption split between above and below norm consumers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Above norm Above norm Below norm Below norm
Post-intervention 1.148*** 0.471*** 0.498 0.434***
(0.107) (0.096) (0.100) (0.112)
Post * treat1 -0.364*** -0.228** 0.001 -0.304**
(0.160) (0.121) (0.131) (0.128)
Post * treat2 -0.410*** -0.213* 0.109 -0.127
(0.131) (0.126) (0.140) (0.140) )
Constant 4.900*** 4.149*** 2.185*** 2.197***
(0.053) (0.022) (0.046) (0.023)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
N 148,068 40,119 146,494 39,646
Time frame Oct2010 - Nov2011 - Oct2010 - Nov2011
Mar2012 Mar2012 Mar2012 Mar2012
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
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Table 8: Gas consumption over October 2010 - March 2012 - heterogeneous
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-intervention -0.854*** -0.854*** -0.830*** -0.854*** -0.830*** -0.830***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.071) (0.071)
Post * treat1 0.383** -0.170 -0.263 -0.332** -0.038 -0.195
(0.166) (0.122) (0.358) (0.138) (0.387) (0.373)
Post * treat2 0.052 -0.252* -0.037 -0.127 -0.212 -0.315
(0.168) (0.114) (0.201) (0.134) (0.333) (0.229)
Post * treat1 * beds -0.301*** -0.310*** -0.292***
(0.069) (0.090) (0.083)
Post * treat2 * beds -0.112 0.179** 0.173**
(0.079) (0.090) (0.076)
Post * treat1 * lease -0.166 0.139 -0.288
(0.216) (0.422) (0.356)
Post * treat2 * lease 0.543** -0.046 -0.122
(0.222) (0.449) (0.345)
Post * treat1 * age 0.001 0.007 0.0003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Post * treat2 * age -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Post * treat1 * male 0.396** 0.103 0.020
(0.173) (0.186) (0.165)
Post * treat2 * male -0.090 -0.071 -0.121
(0.163) (0.201) (0.170)
Post * treat1 * under 1.087***
(0.156)
Post * treat2 * under 1.132***
(0.154)
Constant 4.970*** 4.876*** 4.339*** 4.339*** 3.551*** 3.179***
(0.088) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.016)
R2 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01
N 12,989 50,399 117,033 117,033 294,562 79,765
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
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Table 9: Difference-in-difference electricity (kWh) regressions for subgroup 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-intervention -59.470*** -72.962*** -100.076*** -86.519***
(3.257) (2.530) (2.828) (2.225)
Post * treat1 1.915 4.143 -4.283 -0.070
(8.292) (6.441) (7.200) (5.666)
Post * treat2 -4.153 -3.752 -15.014** -9.383
(8.493) (6.597) (7.375) (5.803)
R2 0.11 0.18 0.28 0.22
N 2,704 3,380 3,380 4,732
Time period April April-May June-July April-July
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
Table 10: Difference-in-difference electricity (kWh) regressions for subgroup 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-intervention -64.734*** -79.926*** -114.884*** -97.405***
(5.691) (4.250) (4.190) (3.340)
Post * treat3 11.469 7.755 6.296 7.025
(13.665) (10.206) (10.061) (8.021)
Post * treat4 8.555 4.802 1.721 3.262
(13.729) (10.253) (10.108) (8.058)
R2 0.06 0.12 0.22 0.16
N 2,432 3,040 3,040 4,256
Time period April April-May June-July April-July
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
Table 11: Difference-in-difference electricity (kWh) regressions for subgroup 3
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-intervention -80.696*** -97.571*** -135.256*** -116.413***
(5.589) (4.349) (4.901) (3.806)
Post * treat5 6.204 -0.836 -1.420 -1.128
(12.965) (10.090) (11.369) (8.829)
Post * treat6 4.94 5.862 14.774 10.318
(12.781) (9.947) (11.208) (8.704)
R2 0.11 0.18 0.24 0.20
N 2,156 2,695 2,695 3,773
Time period April April-May June-July April-July
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
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Table 12: Difference-in-difference electricity (kWh) regressions for subgroup 4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-intervention -88.692*** -104.558*** -152.087*** -128.322***
(7.077) (5.413) (5.661) (4.478)
Post * treat7 -30.566*** -38.462*** -36.443*** -37.453***
(14.596) (9.630) (11.674) (9.234)
R2 0.16 0.24 0.36 0.29
N 1,276 1,595 1,595 2,233
Time period April April-May June-July April-July
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance levels are noted by * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. The variable (Post * Treat1) is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms only
treatment, and the (Post * Treat2) variable is the difference-in-difference estimator for the norms with information
treatment.
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